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		5 June 1980	
	MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD		•
25 X 1	SUBJECT: Conversation with Secretary of 4 June 1980	State,	•
20/1	4 Julie 1980		•
	1. The Secretary opened by saying h	e was sorry he had	missed my
	Presidential briefing, so I swung right i abbreviated version. He listened attenti	nto that. I went t	hrough the
	section on Afghanistan,		2 2
	Q 7 1		
	I asked him about the PDB suppor Executive Assistant about this. Unfortun	ately. I do not hav	e anv help
	with respect to his schedule and whether time for presenting the PDB to him. He s	we can get anv more	regular
	and with the responsiveness to questions	he has raised from	time to time
	I would, incidentally, like to see questing feel for what is on his mind.	ons that he raises	to get a 2
		ion momo with him	
	I didn't raise the political act doubted that he had read it or was up to	speed on it.	as I really 2
	4. I discussed idea o	f foreign policy re	assessment 2
	He thought it was a good idea. He, in ef	fect, encouraged me	to come back
	with a specific plan for how to go about maybe he will help with that, too. The the	hree of us had a co	nsiderable
	discussion with regard to the hazards of s formulation. The Secretary has set out a	short-term foreign ı	policy
	develop some manageable foreign policy go	als for the near te	rm, but he
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recognizes he would like to merge those into a longer term perspective on where we are going. In short, we have no immediate answer on this one but we have planted a seed towards progress.	2:
5. I discussed my trin and got his general approval for	2
6. In the conversation on long-term goals, he lamented the fact that we really don't have a long-term policy with respect to Afghanistan or Iran. He said, for instance, that the things we have going like COCO and grain embargo are all right but not pointed towards some effective solution. I used that opportunity to show him the statistics on the Soviet grain forecast.	M
I also used that as an opportunity to stress the fact that we had to be patient and have some policies that didn't have a final solution that was visible.	on 2
7. I delivered the Intelligence Memorandum on possible trials of the hostages.	2
8. Ron Spiers mentioned to the Secretary that Bill Miller of the SSCI had come to see him requesting regular distribution of the INR Daily Summary. Ron was generally in favor of acceding to this request if the Secretary and I concurred. I expressed some modest reservations about it, pointing out that we had had problems in keeping sensitive, near raw intelligence off the Hill until we could do something about it. The Secretary told Spiers not to grant this to Miller but to tell Miller that Bayh would have to call him directly. I suspect if Bayh does call	•
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